



equally to this work
‡These authors also contributed







Funding: See page 17
Received: 08 May 2020
Accepted: 10 May 2020
Published: 11 May 2020
Reviewing editor: Jos WM van
der Meer, Radboud University
Medical Centre, Netherlands
Copyright Rivett et al. This
article is distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use and
redistribution provided that the
original author and source are
credited.
Screening of healthcare workers for
SARS-CoV-2 highlights the role of
asymptomatic carriage in COVID-19
transmission
Lucy Rivett1,2†, Sushmita Sridhar3,4,5†, Dominic Sparkes1,2†,
Matthew Routledge1,2†, Nick K Jones1,2,4,5†, Sally Forrest4,5, Jamie Young6,
Joana Pereira-Dias4,5, William L Hamilton1,2, Mark Ferris7, M Estee Torok5,8,
Luke Meredith9, The CITIID-NIHR COVID-19 BioResource Collaboration,
Martin D Curran2, Stewart Fuller10, Afzal Chaudhry11, Ashley Shaw10,
Richard J Samworth12, John R Bradley4,13, Gordon Dougan4,5,
Kenneth GC Smith4,5, Paul J Lehner1,4,5, Nicholas J Matheson1,4,5,14, Giles Wright7,
Ian G Goodfellow9‡, Stephen Baker4,5‡, Michael P Weekes1,4,5‡*
1Department of Infectious Diseases, Cambridge University NHS Hospitals
Foundation Trust, Cambridge, United Kingdom; 2Clinical Microbiology and Public
Health Laboratory, Public Health England, Cambridge, United Kingdom; 3Wellcome
Sanger Institute, Hinxton, United Kingdom; 4Department of Medicine, University of
Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom; 5Cambridge Institute of Therapeutic
Immunology and Infectious Disease (CITIID), Jeffrey Cheah Biomedical Centre,
Cambridge Biomedical Campus, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United
Kingdom; 6Academic Department of Medical Genetics, University of Cambridge,
Cambridge, United Kingdom; 7Occupational Health and Wellbeing, Cambridge
University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, Cambridge, United Kingdom;
8Department of Microbiology, Cambridge University NHS Hospitals Foundation
Trust, Cambridge, United Kingdom; 9Division of Virology, Department of Pathology,
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom; 10National Institutes for
Health Research Cambridge, Clinical Research Facility, Cambridge, United
Kingdom; 11Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, Cambridge,
United Kingdom; 12Statistical Laboratory, Centre for Mathematical Sciences,
Cambridge, United Kingdom; 13National Institutes for Health Research Cambridge
Biomedical Research Centre, Cambridge, United Kingdom; 14NHS Blood and
Transplant, Cambridge, United Kingdom
Abstract Significant differences exist in the availability of healthcare worker (HCW) SARS-CoV-2
testing between countries, and existing programmes focus on screening symptomatic rather than
asymptomatic staff. Over a 3 week period (April 2020), 1032 asymptomatic HCWs were screened
for SARS-CoV-2 in a large UK teaching hospital. Symptomatic staff and symptomatic household
contacts were additionally tested. Real-time RT-PCR was used to detect viral RNA from a throat
+nose self-swab. 3% of HCWs in the asymptomatic screening group tested positive for SARS-CoV-
2. 17/30 (57%) were truly asymptomatic/pauci-symptomatic. 12/30 (40%) had experienced
symptoms compatible with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)>7 days prior to testing, most self-
isolating, returning well. Clusters of HCW infection were discovered on two independent wards.
Viral genome sequencing showed that the majority of HCWs had the dominant lineage B. 1. Our
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data demonstrates the utility of comprehensive screening of HCWs with minimal or no symptoms.
This approach will be critical for protecting patients and hospital staff.
Introduction
Despite the World Health Organisation (WHO) advocating widespread testing for SARS-CoV-2,
national capacities for implementation have diverged considerably (WHO, 2020b; Our World in
Data, 2020). In the UK, the strategy has been to perform SARS-CoV-2 testing for essential workers
who are symptomatic themselves or have symptomatic household contacts. This approach has been
exemplified by recent studies of symptomatic HCWs (Hunter et al., 2020; Keeley et al., 2020). The
role of nosocomial transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is becoming increasingly recognised, accounting for
12–29% of cases in some reports (Wang et al., 2020). Importantly, data suggest that the severity
and mortality risk of nosocomial transmission may be greater than for community-acquired COVID-
19 (McMichael et al., 2020).
Protection of HCWs and their families from the acquisition of COVID-19 in hospitals is paramount,
and underscored by rising numbers of HCW deaths nationally and internationally (Cook et al., 2020;
CDC COVID-19 Response Team, 2020). In previous epidemics, HCW screening programmes have
boosted morale, decreased absenteeism and potentially reduced long-term psychological sequelae
(McAlonan et al., 2007). Screening also allows earlier return to work when individuals or their family
members test negative (Hunter et al., 2020; Keeley et al., 2020). Another major consideration is
the protection of vulnerable patients from a potentially infectious workforce (McMichael et al.,
2020), particularly as social distancing is not possible whilst caring for patients. Early identification
and isolation of infectious HCWs may help prevent onward transmission to patients and colleagues,
and targeted infection prevention and control measures may reduce the risk of healthcare-associ-
ated outbreaks.
The clinical presentation of COVID-19 can include minimal or no symptoms (WHO, 2020a).
Asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic transmission is clearly reported and is estimated to account for
around half of all cases of COVID-19 (He et al., 2020). Screening approaches focussed solely on
symptomatic HCWs are therefore unlikely to be adequate for suppression of nosocomial spread.
Preliminary data suggests that mass screening and isolation of asymptomatic individuals can be an
effective method for halting transmission in community-based settings (Day, 2020). Recent model-
ling has suggested that weekly testing of asymptomatic HCWs could reduce onward transmission by
16–23%, on top of isolation based on symptoms, provided results are available within 24 hr
(Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team, 2020). The need for widespread adoption of an
expanded screening programme for asymptomatic, as well as symptomatic HCWs, is apparent
(Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team, 2020; Black et al., 2020; Gandhi et al., 2020).
Challenges to the roll-out of an expanded screening programme include the ability to increase
diagnostic testing capacity, logistical issues affecting sampling and turnaround times and concerns
about workforce depletion should substantial numbers of staff test positive. Here, we describe how
we have dealt with these challenges and present initial findings from a comprehensive staff screen-
ing programme at Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (CUHNFT). This has
included systematic screening of >1000 asymptomatic HCWs in their workplace, in addition to >200
symptomatic staff or household contacts. Screening was performed using a validated real-time
reverse transcription PCR (RT-PCR) assay detecting SARS-CoV-2 from combined oropharyngeal (OP)
and nasopharyngeal (NP) swabs (Sridhar et al., 2020). Rapid viral sequencing of positive samples
was used to further assess potential epidemiological linkage where nosocomial transmission was sus-
pected. Our experience highlights the value of programmes targeting both symptomatic and asymp-
tomatic staff, and will be informative for the establishment of similar programmes in the UK and
globally.
Results
Characteristics of HCW and testing groups
Between 6th and 24th April 2020, 1,270 HCWs in CUHNFT and their symptomatic household contacts
were swabbed and tested for SARS-CoV-2 by real-time RT-PCR. The median age of the HCWs was
Rivett et al. eLife 2020;9:e58728. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.58728 2 of 20
Research article Epidemiology and Global Health Human Biology and Medicine
34; 71% were female and 29% male. The technical RT-PCR failure rate was 2/1,270 (0. 2% see
Materials and methods); these were excluded from the ‘Tested’ population for further analysis. Ulti-
mately, 5% (n = 61) of swabs were SARS-CoV-2 positive. 21 individuals underwent repeat testing for
a variety of reasons, including evolving symptoms (n = 3) and scoring ‘medium’ probability on clinical
COVID-19 criteria (Tables 1–2) (n = 11). All remained SARS-CoV-2 negative. Turn around time from
sample collection to resulting was 12–36 hr; this varied according to the time samples were
obtained.
Table 3 outlines the total number of SARS-CoV-2 tests performed in each screening group (HCW
asymptomatic, HCW symptomatic, and HCW symptomatic household contact) categorised accord-
ing to the ward with the highest anticipated risk of exposure to COVID-19 (‘red’, high; ‘amber’,
medium; ‘green’, low; Tables 4–5). In total, 31/1,032 (3%) of those tested in the HCW asymptomatic
screening group tested SARS-CoV-2 positive. In comparison, 30/221 (14%) tested positive when
HCW symptomatic and HCW symptomatic household contact screening groups were combined. As
expected, symptomatic HCWs and their household contacts were significantly more likely to test
positive than HCWs from the asymptomatic screening group (p<0. 0001, Fisher’s exact test). HCWs
working in ‘red’ or ‘amber’ wards were significantly more likely to test positive than those working in
‘green’ wards (p=0. 0042, Fisher’s exact test).
All users of FFP3 masks underwent routine fit-testing prior to usage. Cleaning and re-use of
masks, theatre caps, gloves, aprons or gowns was actively discouraged. Cleaning and re-use of eye
protection was permitted for certain types of goggles and visors, as specified in the hospital’s PPE
protocol. Single-use eye protection was in use in most Scenario 1 and 2 areas, and was not cleaned
and re-used. All non-invasive ventilation or use of high-flow nasal oxygen on laboratory-confirmed or
eLife digest Patients admitted to NHS hospitals are now routinely screened for SARS-CoV-2
(the virus that causes COVID-19), and isolated from other patients if necessary. Yet healthcare
workers, including frontline patient-facing staff such as doctors, nurses and physiotherapists, are
only tested and excluded from work if they develop symptoms of the illness.
However, there is emerging evidence that many people infected with SARS-CoV-2 never develop
significant symptoms: these people will therefore be missed by ‘symptomatic-only’ testing. There is
also important data showing that around half of all transmissions of SARS-CoV-2 happen before the
infected individual even develops symptoms. This means that much broader testing programs are
required to spot people when they are most infectious.
Rivett, Sridhar, Sparkes, Routledge et al. set out to determine what proportion of healthcare
workers was infected with SARS-CoV-2 while also feeling generally healthy at the time of testing.
Over 1,000 staff members at a large UK hospital who felt they were well enough to work, and did
not fit the government criteria for COVID-19 infection, were tested. Amongst these, 3% were
positive for SARS-CoV-2. On closer questioning, around one in five reported no symptoms, two in
five very mild symptoms that they had dismissed as inconsequential, and a further two in five
reported COVID-19 symptoms that had stopped more than a week previously. In parallel, healthcare
workers with symptoms of COVID-19 (and their household contacts) who were self-isolating were
also tested, in order to allow those without the virus to quickly return to work and bolster a
stretched workforce.
Finally, the rates of infection were examined to probe how the virus could have spread through
the hospital and among staff – and in particular, to understand whether rates of infection were
greater among staff working in areas devoted to COVID-19 patients. Despite wearing appropriate
personal protective equipment, healthcare workers in these areas were almost three times more
likely to test positive than those working in areas without COVID-19 patients. However, it is not clear
whether this genuinely reflects greater rates of patients passing the infection to staff. Staff may give
the virus to each other, or even acquire it at home.
Overall, this work implies that hospitals need to be vigilant and introduce broad screening
programmes across their workforces. It will be vital to establish such approaches before ‘lockdown’
is fully lifted, so healthcare institutions are prepared for any second peak of infections.
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clinically suspected COVID-19 patients was performed in negative-pressure ( 5 pascals) side rooms,
with 10 air changes per hour and use of Scenario 2 PPE. All other aerosol generating procedures
were undertaken with Scenario 2 PPE precautions, in negative- or neutral- pressure facilities. General
clinical areas underwent a minimum of 6 air changes per hour, but all critical care areas underwent a
minimum of 10 air changes per hour as a matter of routine. Surgical operating theatres routinely
underwent a minimum of 25 air changes per hour.
Viral loads varied between individuals, potentially reflecting the nature of the sampling site. How-
ever, for individuals testing positive for SARS-CoV-2, viral loads were significantly lower for those in
the HCW asymptomatic screening group than in those tested due to the presence of symptoms (Fig-
ure 1). For the HCW symptomatic and HCW symptomatic contact screening groups, viral loads did
not correlate with duration of symptoms or with clinical criteria risk score (Figure 1—figure supple-
ment 1 and data not shown).
Three subgroups of SARS-CoV-2 positive asymptomatic HCW
Each individual in the HCW asymptomatic screening group was contacted by telephone to establish
a clinical history, and COVID-19 probability criteria (Table 1) were retrospectively applied to catego-
rise any symptoms in the month prior to testing (Figure 2). One HCW could not be contacted to
obtain further history. Individuals captured by the HCW asymptomatic screening group were gener-
ally asymptomatic at the time of screening, however could be divided into three sub-groups: (i)
HCWs with no symptoms at all, (ii) HCWs with (chiefly low-to-medium COVID-19 probability) symp-
toms commencing 7 days prior to screening and (iii) HCWs with (typically high COVID-19 probabil-
ity) symptoms commencing >7 days prior to screening (Figure 2). 9/12 (75%) individuals with
symptom onset >7 days previously had appropriately self-isolated and then returned to work. One
individual with no symptoms at the time of swabbing subsequently developed symptoms prior to
being contacted with their positive result. Overall, 5/1032 (0.5%) individuals in the asymptomatic
screening group were identified as truly asymptomatic carriers of SARS-CoV-2, and 1/1032 (0.1%)
was identified as pre-symptomatic. Box 1 shows illustrative clinical vignettes.
Identification of two clusters of cases by screening asymptomatic
HCWs
For the HCW asymptomatic screening group, nineteen wards were identified for systematic priority
screening as part of hospital-wide surveillance. Two further areas were specifically targeted for
screening due to unusually high staff sickness rates (ward F), or concerns about appropriate PPE
Table 1. Clinical criteria for estimating pre-test probability of COVID-19.
COVID-19 probability criteria
Major Fever (>37.8 ˚C)
New persistent cough









Nausea and/or vomiting and/or diarrhoea
Loss of sense of taste or smell
*Unprotected close contact defined as either face-to-face contact or spending more than 15 min within 2 metres of
an infected person, without wearing appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE).
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usage (ward Q) (Figure 3). Interestingly, in line with findings in the total HCW population, a signifi-
cantly greater proportion of HCWs working on ‘red’ wards compared to HCWs working on ‘green’
wards tested positive as part of the asymptomatic screening programme (‘green’ 6/310 vs ‘red’ 19/
372; p=0.0389, Fisher’s exact test). The proportion of HCW with a positive test was significantly
higher on Ward F than on other wards categorised as ‘green’ clinical areas (ward F 4/43 vs other
‘green’ wards 2/267; p=0.0040, Fisher’s exact test). Likewise, amongst wards in the ‘red’ areas, ward
Q showed significantly higher rates of positive HCW test results (ward Q 7/37 vs other ‘red’ wards
12/335; p=0.0011, Fisher’s exact test).
Ward F is an elderly care ward, designated as a ‘green’ area with Scenario 0 PPE (Tables 4–
5), with a high proportion of COVID-19 vulnerable patients due to age and comorbidity. 4/43 (9%)
ward staff tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. In addition, two staff members on this ward tested posi-
tive in the HCW symptomatic/symptomatic contact screening groups. All positive HCWs were
requested to self-isolate, the ward was closed to admissions and escalated to Scenario 1 PPE
(Table 5). Reactive screening of a further 18 ward F staff identified an additional three positive
asymptomatic HCWs (Figure 4). Sequence analysis indicated that 6/9 samples from HCW who
worked on ward F belonged to SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1 (currently known to be circulating in at least
43 countries [Rambaut et al., 2020]), with a further two that belonged to B1. 7 and one that
belonged to B2.1. This suggests more than two introductions of SARS-CoV-2 into the HCW popula-
tion on ward F (Figure 4—figure supplements 1–2, Table 6). It was subsequently found that two
Table 2. Categories of pre-test probability of COVID-19, according to the presence of clinical
features shown in Table 1.
Stratification of COVID-19 probability Implications for exclusion from work
High
probability
2 major symptoms or
1 major symptom and  2
minor symptoms
Self-isolate for 7 days from the date of onset, regardless of the test
result. Only return to work if afebrile for 48 hr and symptoms have
improved*.
Household contacts should self-quarantine for 14 days from the date
of symptom onset in the index case, regardless of the test result. If
they develop symptoms, they should self-isolate for 7 days from the




1 major symptom or
0 major symptoms and  3
minor symptoms
Test result positive: self-isolate for 7 days from the date of onset, and
only return to work if afebrile for 48 hr and symptoms have improved*.
Household contacts should self-quarantine for 14 days from the date
of index case symptom onset. If they develop symptoms, they should
self-isolate for 7 days from the date of onset, and only return to work if
afebrile for 48 hr and symptoms have improved*.
Test result negative: repeat testing at 48 hr from the initial swab. If
repeat testing is positive, follow the advice detailed above. If repeat
testing is negative, return to work, unless symptoms worsen. Self-
quarantine not required for household contacts.
Low
probability
0 major symptoms and 1–2
minor symptoms
Test result positive: self-isolate for 7 days from the date of test, and
only return to work if afebrile for 48 hr and symptoms have improved*.
Household contacts should self-quarantine for 14 days from the date
of test. If they develop symptoms, they should self-isolate for 7 days
from the date of onset, and only return to work if afebrile for 48 hr and
symptoms have improved*.
Test result negative: return to work, unless symptoms worsen. Self-
quarantine not required for household contacts.
Asymptomatic 0 major symptoms and 0
minor symptoms
Test result positive: self-isolate for 7 days from the date of test. If
symptoms develop after the test, self-isolation should occur for 7 days
from the date of onset, and return to work should only occur if afebrile
for 48 hr and symptoms have improved*. Household contacts should
self-quarantine for 14 days from the date of the test. If they develop
symptoms, they should self-isolate for 7 days from the date of onset,
and only return to work if afebrile for 48 hr and symptoms have
improved*.
Test result negative: continue working, unless symptoms develop. Self-
quarantine not required for household contacts.
*Residual cough in the absence of other symptoms should not preclude returning to work.
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further staff members from ward F had previously been admitted to hospital with severe COVID-19
infection.
Ward Q is a general medical ward designated as a ‘red’ clinical area for the care of COVID-19
positive patients, with a Scenario 1 PPE protocol (Tables 4–5). Here, 7/37 (19%) ward staff tested
positive for SARS-CoV-2. In addition, one staff member tested positive as part of the HCW symp-
tomatic screening group, within the same period as ward surveillance. Reactive screening of a further
five staff working on Ward Q uncovered one additional infection. 4/4 sequenced viruses were of the
B.1 lineage (Figure 4—figure supplements 1–2, Table 6; other isolates could not be sequenced
due to a sample CT value >30). All positive HCWs were requested to self-isolate, and infection con-
trol and PPE reviews were undertaken to ensure that environmental cleaning and PPE donning/doff-
ing practices were compliant with hospital protocol. Staff training and education was provided to
address observed instances of incorrect infection control or PPE practice.
Ward O, a ‘red’ medical ward, had similar numbers of asymptomatic HCWs screened as ward F,
and a similar positivity rate (4/44; 9%). This ward was listed for further cluster investigation after the
study ended, however incorrect PPE usage was not noted during the study period.
Characteristics of the HCW symptomatic and HCW symptomatic-
contact screening groups
The majority of individuals who tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 after screening due to the presence
of symptoms had high COVID-19 probability (Table 7). This reflects national guidance regarding
self-isolation at the time of our study (UK Government, 2020a).
Discussion
Through the rapid establishment of an expanded HCW SARS-CoV-2 screening programme, we dis-
covered that 31/1,032 (3%) of HCWs tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 in the absence of symptoms.
Of 30 individuals from this asymptomatic screening group studied in more depth, 6/30 (20%) had
not experienced any symptoms at the time of their test. 1/6 became symptomatic suggesting that
the true asymptomatic carriage rate was 5/1,032 (0.5%). 11/30 (37%) had experienced mild symp-
toms prior to testing. Whilst temporally associated, it cannot be assumed that these symptoms nec-
essarily resulted from COVID-19. These proportions are difficult to contextualise due to paucity of
Table 3. Total number of SARS-CoV-2 tests performed in each screening group categorised
according to the highest risk ward of potential exposure.
Clinical area
Green Amber Red Unknown Total
















































Table 4. The hospital’s traffic-light colouring system for categorising wards according to anticipated COVID-19 exposure risk.
Different types of PPE were used in each (Table 5).
Red (high risk) Amber (medium risk) Green (low risk)
Areas with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR positive
patients, or patients with very high clinical
suspicion of COVID-19
Areas with patients awaiting SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR test
results, or that have been exposed and may be
incubating infection
Areas with no known SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR
positive patients, and none with clinically
suspected COVID-19
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point-prevalence data from asymptomatic individuals in similar healthcare settings or the wider com-
munity. For contrast, 60% of asymptomatic residents in a recent study tested positive in the midst of
a care home outbreak (Arons et al., 2020). Regardless of the proportion, however, many secondary
and tertiary hospital-acquired infections were undoubtedly prevented by identifying and isolating
these SARS-CoV-2 positive HCWs.
Table 5. PPE protocols (‘Scenarios’) and their relation to ward category.
PPE ‘Scenarios’
Scenario 0 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Area
description
All clinical areas without any known or
suspected COVID-19 cases
Designated ward, triage and
assessment-based care with
suspected or confirmed COVID-
19 patients
Cohorted areas where aerosol-
generating procedures are carried out









Fluid resistant face mask at all times,
apron and non-sterile gloves for
patient contact (within two metres)
Surgical scrubs, fluid resistant
face mask, theatre cap, eye
protection, apron and non-
sterile gloves
Water repellent gown, FFP3 mask, eye
protection, theatre cap, surgical
gloves, with an apron and non-sterile









for example designated areas of
emergency department and medical
admissions unit. Medical, surgical and
haematology wards/outpatient clinics.
Amber + red wards,





Amber + red wards,
for example intensive care unit,






Figure 1. SARS-CoV-2 RNA CT (cycle threshold) values for those individuals who tested positive shown according
to HCW group. HCW asymptomatic screening group (green circles); HCW symptomatic or symptomatic
household contact screening groups (blue squares). A Mann Whitney test was used to compare the two groups.
Bars: median + / - interquartile range. Note that lower CT values correspond to earlier detection of the viral RNA
in the RT-PCR process and therefore identify swabs with higher numbers of copies of the viral genome.
The online version of this article includes the following figure supplement(s) for figure 1:
Figure supplement 1. SARS-CoV-2 RNA CT values for HCWs testing positive according to presence and duration
of symptoms.
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12/30 (40%) individuals from the HCW asymptomatic screening group reported symptoms > 7
days prior to testing, and the majority experiencing symptoms consistent with a high probability of
COVID-19 had appropriately self-isolated during that period. Patients with COVID-19 can remain
SARS-CoV-2 PCR positive for a median of 20 days (IQR 17–24) after symptom onset (Zhou et al.,
2020), and the limited data available suggest viable virus is not shed beyond eight days
(Wölfel et al., 2020). A pragmatic approach was taken to allowing individuals to remain at work,
where the HCW had experienced high probability symptoms starting >7 days and 1 month prior to
their test and had been well for the preceding 48 hr. This approach was based on the following: low
seasonal incidence of alternative viral causes of high COVID-19 probability symptoms in the UK
(Public Health England, 2018), the high potential for SARS-CoV-2 exposure during the pandemic
and the potential for prolonged, non-infectious shedding of viral RNA (Zhou et al., 2020;
Wölfel et al., 2020). For other individuals, we applied standard national guidelines requiring isola-
tion for seven days from the point of testing (UK Government, 2020b). However, for HCW develop-
ing symptoms after a positive swab, isolation was extended for seven days from symptom onset.
Our data clearly demonstrate that focusing solely on the testing of individuals fitting a strict clini-
cal case definition for COVID-19 will inevitably miss asymptomatic and pauci-symptomatic disease.
This is of particular importance in the presence of falling numbers of community COVID-19 cases, as
hospitals will become potential epicentres of local outbreaks. Therefore, we suggest that in the set-
ting of limited testing capacity, a high priority should be given to a reactive asymptomatic screening
programme that responds in real-time to HCW sickness trends, or (to add precision) incidence of
positive tests by area. The value of this approach is illustrated by our detection of a cluster of cases
in ward F, where the potential for uncontrolled staff-to-staff or staff-to-patient transmission could
have led to substantial morbidity and mortality in a particularly vulnerable patient group. As SARS-
CoV-2 testing capacity increases, rolling programmes of serial screening for asymptomatic staff in all
Box 1. Clinical vignettes.
Self-isolation instructions were as described in Table 2.
Case 1: Completely asymptomatic. HCW1 had recently worked on four wards (two ‘green’, two ‘amber’). Upon testing posi-
tive, she reported no symptoms over the preceding three weeks, and was requested to go home and self-isolate immediately.
HCW1 lived with her partner who had no suggestive symptoms. Upon follow-up telephone consultation 14 days after the test,
HCW1 had not developed any significant symptoms, suggesting true asymptomatic infection.
Case 2: Pre-symptomatic. HCW2 was swabbed whilst asymptomatic, testing positive. When telephoned with the result, she
reported a cough, fever and headache starting within the last 24 hr and was advised to self-isolate from the time of onset of
symptoms (Table 2). Her partner, also a HCW, was symptomatic and had been confirmed as SARS-CoV-2 positive 2 days previ-
ously, suggesting likely transmission of infection to HCW2.
Case 3: Low clinical probability of COVID HCW3 developed mild self-limiting pharyngitis three days prior to screening and
continued to work in the absence of cough or fever. She had been working in’ green’ areas of the hospital, due to a back-
ground history of asthma. Self-isolation commenced from the time of the positive test. HCW3’s only contact outside the hospi-
tal, her housemate, was well. On follow-up telephone consultation, HCW3’s mild symptoms had fully resolved, with no
development of fever or persistent cough, suggesting pauci-symptomatic infection.
Case 4: Medium clinical probability of COVID HCW4 experienced anosmia, nausea and headache three days prior to screen-
ing, and continued to work in the absence of cough or fever. Self-isolation commenced from the time of the positive test. One
son had experienced a mild cough ~3 weeks prior to HCW4’s test, however her partner and other son were completely asymp-
tomatic. Upon follow-up telephone consultation 10 days after the test, HCW4’s mild symptoms had not progressed, but had
not yet resolved.
Case 5: High clinical probability of COVID. HCW5 had previously self-isolated, and did not repeat this in the presence of new
high-probability symptoms six days before screening. Self-isolation commenced from the date of the new symptoms with the
caveat that they should be completely well for 48 hr prior to return to work. All household contacts were well. However,
another close colleague working on the same ward had also tested positive, suggesting potential transmission between HCWs
on that ward.
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areas of the hospital is recommended, with the frequency of screening being dictated by anticipated
probability of infection. The utility of this approach in care-homes and other essential institutions
should also be explored, as should serial screening of long-term inpatients.
The early success of our programme relied upon substantial collaborative efforts between a
diverse range of local stakeholders. Similar collaborations will likely play a key role in the rapid, de
novo development of comprehensive screening programmes elsewhere. The full benefits of
enhanced HCW screening are critically dependent upon rapid availability of results. A key success of
our programme has been bespoke optimisation of sampling and laboratory workflows enabling
same-day resulting, whilst minimising disruption to hospital processes by avoiding travel to off-site
testing facilities. Rapid turnaround for testing and sequencing is vital in enabling timely response to
localised infection clusters, as is the maintenance of reserve capacity to allow urgent, reactive
investigations.
There appeared to be a significantly higher incidence of HCW infections in ‘red’ compared to
‘green’ wards. Many explanations for this observation exist, and this study cannot differentiate
between them. Possible explanations include transmission between patients and HCW, HCW-to-
HCW transmission, variability of staff exposure outside the workplace and non-random selection of
wards. It is also possible that, even over the three weeks of the study, ‘red’ wards were sampled ear-
lier during the evolution of the epidemic when transmission was greater. Further research into these
findings is clearly needed on a larger scale. Furthermore, given the clear potential for pre-symptom-
atic and asymptomatic transmission amongst HCWs, and data suggesting that infectivity may peak
prior to symptom onset (He et al., 2020), there is a strong argument for basic PPE provision in all
clinical areas.
The identification of transmission within the hospital through routine data is problematic. Hospi-
tals are not closed systems and are subject to numerous external sources of infection. Coronaviruses
generally have very low mutation rates (~10 6 per site per cycle) (Sanjuán et al., 2010), with the first
reported sequence of the current pandemic only published on 12th January 2020 (GenBank, 2020).
In addition, given SARS CoV-2 was only introduced into the human population in late 2019, there is
at present a lack of diversity in circulating strains. However, as the pandemic unfolds and detailed
epidemiological and genome sequence data from patient and HCW clusters are generated, real-
time study of transmission dynamics will become an increasingly important means of informing dis-
ease control responses and rapidly confirming (or refuting) hospital acquired infection. Importantly,
Figure 2. Three subgroups of staff testing SARS-CoV-2 positive from the HCW asymptomatic screening group.
(central pie chart, described in detail in the main text). n = number of individuals (% percentage of total). The
peripheral pie charts show number and percentage of individuals in groups (ii – right pie chart) and (iii – left pie
chart) with low, medium and high COVID-19 probability symptoms upon retrospective analysis.
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implementation of such a programme would require active screening and rapid sequencing of posi-
tive cases in both the HCW and patient populations. Prospective epidemiological data will also
inform whether hospital staff are more likely to be infected in the community or at work, and may
identify risk factors for the acquisition of infection, such as congregation in communal staff areas or
inadequate access to PPE.
Our study is limited by the relatively short time-frame, a small number of positive tests and a lack
of behavioural data. In particular, the absence of detailed workplace and community epidemiological
data makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions with regards to hospital transmission dynamics. The
low rate of observed positive tests may be partly explained by low rates of infection in the East of
England in comparison with other areas of the UK (cumulative incidence 0.17%, thus far)
(Public Health England, 2020). The long-term benefits of HCW screening on healthcare systems will
be informed by sustained longitudinal sampling of staff in multiple locations. More comprehensive
data will parametrise workforce depletion and COVID-19 transmission models. The incorporation of
additional information including staffing levels, absenteeism, and changes in proportions of staff
self-isolating before and after the introduction of widespread testing will better inform the impact of
screening at a national and international level. Such models will be critical for optimising the impact
on occupationally-acquired COVID-19, and reducing the likelihood that hospitals become hubs for
sustained COVID-19 transmission.
In the absence of an efficacious vaccine, additional waves of COVID-19 are likely as social distanc-
ing rules are relaxed. Understanding how to limit hospital transmission will be vital in determining
Figure 3. Distribution of SARS-CoV-2 positive cases across 21 clinical areas, detected by ward-based
asymptomatic screening. (underlying data shown in ‘Source Data’). Wards are coloured (‘green’, ‘amber’, ‘red’)
according to risk of anticipated exposure to COVID-19 (Table 4). HCWs working across >1 ward were counted for
each area. The left-hand y-axis shows the percentage of positive results from a given ward compared to the total
positive results from the HCW asymptomatic screening group (blue bars). The right-hand y-axis shows the total
number of SARS-CoV-2 tests (stars) and the number positive (pink circles). Additional asymptomatic screening
tests were subsequently performed in an intensified manner on ward F and ward Q after identification of clusters
of positive cases on these wards (Figure 4). Asymptomatic screening tests were also performed for a number of
individuals from other clinical areas on an opportunistic basis; none of these individuals tested positive. Results of
these additional tests are included in summary totals in Table 1, but not in this figure.
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infection control policy, and retain its relevance when reliable serological testing becomes widely
available. Our data suggest that the roll-out of screening programmes to include asymptomatic as
well as symptomatic patient-facing staff should be a national and international priority. Our
approach may also be of benefit in reducing transmission in other institutions, for example care-
homes. Taken together, these measures will increase patient confidence and willingness to access
healthcare services, benefiting both those with COVID-19 and non-COVID-19 disease.
Materials and methods
Staff screening protocols
Two parallel streams of entry into the testing programme were established and managed jointly by
the Occupational Health and Infectious Diseases departments. The first (HCW symptomatic, and
HCW symptomatic household contact screening groups) allowed any patient-facing or non-patient-
facing hospital employee (HCW) to refer themselves or a household contact, including children,
should they develop symptoms suggestive of COVID-19. The second (HCW asymptomatic screening
group) was a rolling programme of testing for all patient-facing and non-patient-facing staff working
in defined clinical areas thought to be at risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Daily workforce sickness
reports and trends in the results of HCW testing were monitored to enable areas of concern to be
highlighted and targeted for screening and cluster analysis, in a reactive approach. High throughput
clinical areas where staff might be exposed to large numbers of suspected COVID-19 patients were
also prioritised for staff screening. These included the Emergency Department, the COVID-19
Assessment Unit, and a number of ‘red’ inpatient wards. Staff caring for the highest priory ‘shielding’
patients (Haematology/Oncology, Transplant medicine) were also screened, as were a representative
sample of staff from ‘Amber’ and ‘Green’ areas. The personal protective equipment (PPE) worn by
staff in these areas is summarised in Table 5. Inclusion into the programme was voluntary, and
offered to all individuals working in a given ward during the time of sampling. Regardless of the
Figure 4. All SARS-CoV-2 positive HCW identified in Wards F and Q, stratified by their mechanism of identification. Individuals testing positive for
SARS-CoV-2 in the ‘HCW asymptomatic screening group’ were identified by the asymptomatic screening programme. Individuals testing positive in the
‘HCW symptomatic/symptomatic household contact groups’ were identified by self-presentation after developing symptoms. Individuals testing
positive in the ‘Reactive screening group’ were identified by an intensified screening programme after initial positive clusters had been recognised.
The online version of this article includes the following figure supplement(s) for figure 4:
Figure supplement 1. Further details of sequencing data.
Figure supplement 2. Phylogenetic tree of 34 healthcare worker (HCW) SARS-CoV-2 genomes.
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HCW Contact 23 N Not available
H3 Asymptomatic B 31 Y CAMB-
7C0C3
98.61 835.084 B.1
H54 Symptomatic B 35
H12 Symptomatic C 16 Y CAMB-
7FB92
99.60 3312.22 B.1
H19 Asymptomatic E 27 Y CAMB-
7FC26
99.61 3632.26 B.1.1
C2 Asymptomatic F 15.5 Y CAMB-
7FC08
99.60 3157.08 B.1
H17 Asymptomatic F 33.6 Y CAMB-
7FBFC
99.61 1167.76 B.1
H20 Asymptomatic F 18 Y CAMB-
7FC35
99.61 1350.65 B.1
H21 Asymptomatic F 22.8 Y CAMB-
7FC44
99.60 3584.79 B.1
H22 Symptomatic F 24 Y CAMB-
7FC53
99.60 3692.14 B.1.7
H23 Asymptomatic F 32.7 Y CAMB-
7FC62
99.60 1610.33 B.2.1
H35 Symptomatic F 36 Y CAMB-
8221F
73.00 104.391 B.1






H38 Asymptomatic K 36 N Not available
H39 Asymptomatic K 31 N Not available
H28 Symptomatic K/R/L/T/OTHER 18 Y CAMB-
7FD32
99.60 3770.36 B.1.11
H11 Asymptomatic M 32 Y CAMB-
7FB83
99.60 1044.43 B.1
H32 Symptomatic N 33 Y CAMB-
81007
97.62 1196.53 B.1
H47 Symptomatic N 32 N Not available
H31 Asymptomatic O 29 Y CAMB-
80FFC
99.59 2286.08 B.1
H45 Asymptomatic O 36 N Not available




H1 Asymptomatic OTHER 23 Y CAMB-
7C0A5
98.61 2277.92 B.1
H6 Symptomatic OTHER 30 Y CAMB-
7FB29
98.75 1317.43 B.1
H7 Symptomatic OTHER 26 Y CAMB-
7FB47
99.61 3599.59 B.1
H10 Symptomatic OTHER 22 Y CAMB-
7FB74
99.60 187.059 B.1
Table 6 continued on next page
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H14 Symptomatic OTHER 34 Y CAMB-
7FBCF
99.61 1066.74 B.1
H16 Asymptomatic OTHER 27.8 Y CAMB-
7FBED
99.60 796.874 B.1
H24 Symptomatic OTHER 21 Y CAMB-
7FC80
98.62 916.884 B.1
H25 Symptomatic OTHER 21 Y CAMB-
7FC9F
99.60 1505.09 B.1
H33 Symptomatic OTHER 35 Y CAMB-
81016
90.92 233.779 B.1
H40 Symptomatic OTHER 23 N Not available
H46 Asymptomatic OTHER 36 N Not available
H55 Symptomatic Other 26
H56 Asymptomatic Other 32
H30 Asymptomatic OTHER/K/O/F 31 Y CAMB-
80FDE
98.61 1773.74 B.1
H5 Symptomatic Q 24 Y CAMB-
7C1A2
97.75 2342.24 B.1
H8 Symptomatic Q 14 Y CAMB-
7FB56
99.60 2452.25 B.1
H18 Asymptomatic Q 30 Y CAMB-
7FC17
99.60 2585.89 B.1
H29 Asymptomatic Q 31 Y CAMB-
80AFB
99.60 2028.31 B.1
H42 Asymptomatic Q 35 N Not available
H44 Asymptomatic Q 28 N Not available
H48 Asymptomatic Q 36 N Not available
H49 Asymptomatic Q 35 N Not available
H4 Symptomatic R 24 Y CAMB-
7C0D2
98.74 2083.89 B.1
H9 Symptomatic R 19 Y CAMB-
7FB65
99.61 3288.11 B.1
H13 Symptomatic R 21 Y CAMB-
7FBA1
99.60 3307.61 B.1
H27 Asymptomatic R 25 Y CAMB-
7FCBD
98.61 1085.78 B.1
H34 Symptomatic R 30 Y CAMB-
81025
99.60 1997.98 B.1
H37 Asymptomatic R 35 N Not available





H15 Symptomatic S/N 32 Y CAMB-
7FBDE
99.60 2246.43 B.1.7
H41 Asymptomatic S/Q 31 N Not available
H2 Asymptomatic T 36 Y CAMB-
7C0B4
93.55 293.223 B.1
H26 Asymptomatic T 32 Y CAMB-
7FCAE
0.03 0.189437 Not available
H50 Symptomatic T 34 N Not available
H43 Asymptomatic U 32 N Not available
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route of entry into the programme, the process for testing and follow-up was identical. Wards were
closed to external visitors.
We devised a scoring system to determine the clinical probability of COVID-19 based on symp-
toms from existing literature (Wang et al., 2020; Giacomelli et al., 2020; Table 1). Self-referring
HCW and staff captured by daily workforce sickness reports were triaged by designated Occupa-
tional Health nurses using these criteria (Table 2). Self-isolating staff in the medium and low proba-
bility categories were prioritised for testing, since a change in the clinical management was most
likely to derive from results.
Self-isolation and household quarantine advice was determined by estimating the pre-test proba-
bility of COVID-19 (high, medium or low) in those with symptoms, based on the presence or absence
of typical features (Tables 1–2). Symptom history was obtained for all symptomatic HCWs at the
time of self-referral, and again for all positive cases via telephone interview when results became
available. All individuals who had no symptoms at the time of testing were followed up by telephone
within 14 days of their result. Pauci-symptomatic individuals were defined as those with low-proba-
bility clinical COVID-19 criteria (Table 2).
Sample collection procedures
Testing was primarily undertaken at temporary on-site facilities. Two ‘Pods’ (self-contained portable
cabins with office, kitchen facilities, generator and toilet) were erected in close proximity both to the
laboratory and main hospital. Outside space was designed to enable car and pedestrian access, and
ensure 2 m social distancing at all times. Individuals attending on foot were given pre-prepared
self-swabbing kits containing a swab, electronically labelled specimen tube, gloves and swabbing
instructions contained in a zip-locked collection bag. Pods were staffed by a team of re-deployed
research nurses, who facilitated self-swabbing by providing instruction as required. Scenario 1 PPE
(Table 5) was worn by Pod nurses at all times. Individuals in cars were handed self-swabbing kits
through the window, with samples dropped in collection bags into collection bins outside. Any chil-
dren (household contacts) were brought to the pods in cars and swabbed in situ by a parent or
guardian.
In addition to Pod-based testing, an outreach HCW asymptomatic screening service was devel-
oped to enable self-swabbing kits to be delivered to HCWs in their area of work, minimising disrup-
tion to the working routine of hospital staff, and maximising Pod availability for symptomatic staff.
Lists of all staff working in target areas over a 24 hr period were assembled, and kits pre-prepared
accordingly. Self-swabbing kits were delivered to target areas by research nurses, who trained senior
nurses in the area to instruct other colleagues on safe self-swabbing technique. Kits were left in tar-
get areas for 24 hr to capture a full cycle of shift patterns, and all kits and delivery equipment were
thoroughly decontaminated with 70% ethanol prior to collection. Twice daily, specimens were deliv-
ered to the laboratory for processing.
Laboratory methods
The swabbing, extraction and amplification methods for this study follow a recently validated proce-
dure (Sridhar et al., 2020). Individuals performed a self-swab at the back of the throat followed by
the nasal cavity as previously described (Our World in Data, 2020). The single dry sterile swab was
immediately placed into transport medium/lysis buffer containing 4M guanidine thiocyanate to
Table 7. Distribution of positive SARS-CoV-2 tests amongst symptomatic individuals with a positive
test result, categorised according to test group and COVID-19 symptom-based probability criteria
(as defined in Table 2).
Distribution of COVID-19 clinical probability scores for
individuals with a positive SARS-CoV-2 test result
High Medium Low Total
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inactivate virus, and carrier RNA. This facilitated BSL2-based manual extraction of viral RNA in the
presence of MS2 bacteriophage amplification control. Use of these reagents and components
avoided the need for nationally employed testing kits. Real-time RT-PCR amplification was per-
formed as previously described and results validated by confirmation of FAM amplification of the
appropriate controls with threshold cycle (CT) 36. Lower CT values correspond to earlier detection
of the viral RNA in the RT-PCR process, corresponding with a higher copy number of the viral
genome. In 2/1,270 cases, RT-PCR failed to amplify the internal control and results were discarded,
with HCW offered a re-test. Sequencing of positive samples was attempted on samples with a
CT 30 using a multiplex PCR based approach (Quick et al., 2017) using the modified ARTIC v2
protocol (Quick, 2020) and v3 primer set (Artic network, 2020). Genomes were assembled using
reference based assembly and the bioinformatic pipeline as described (Quick et al., 2017) using a
20x minimum coverage as a cut-off for any region of the genome and a 50.1% cut-off for calling of
single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). Samples were sequenced as part of the COVID-19 Geno-
mics UK Consortium, COG-UK), a partnership of NHS organisations, academic institutions, UK public
health agencies and the Wellcome Sanger Institute.
Results reporting
As soon as they were available, positive results were telephoned to patients by Infectious Diseases
physicians, who took further details of symptomatology including timing of onset, and gave clinical
advice (Table 2). Negative results were reported by Occupational Health nurses via telephone, or
emailed through a secure internal email system. Advice on returning to work was given as described
in Table 2. Individuals advised to self-isolate were instructed to do so in their usual place of resi-
dence. Particularly vulnerable staff or those who had more severe illness but did not require hospital-
isation were offered follow-up telephone consultations. Individuals without symptoms at the time of
testing were similarly followed up, to monitor for de novo symptoms. Verbal consent was gained for
all results to be reported to the hospital’s infection control and health and safety teams, and to Pub-
lic Health England, who received all positive and negative results as part of a daily reporting stream.
Data extraction and analysis
Swab result data were extracted directly from the hospital-laboratory interface software, Epic (Ver-
ona, Wisconsin, USA). Details of symptoms recorded at the time of telephone consultation were
extracted manually from review of Epic clinical records. Data were collated using Microsoft Excel,
and figures produced with GraphPad Prism (GraphPad Software, La Jolla, California, USA). Fisher’s
exact test was used for comparison of positive rates between groups defined in the main text.
Mann-Whitney testing was used to compare CT values between different categories of tested indi-
viduals. HCW samples that gave SARS CoV-2 genomes were assigned global lineages defined by
Rambaut et al., 2020 using the PANGOLIN utility (O’Toole and McCrone, 2020).
Ethics and consent
As a study of healthcare-associated infections, this investigation is exempt from requiring ethical
approval under Section 251 of the NHS Act 2006 (see also the NHS Health Research Authority algo-
rithm, available at http://www.hra-decisiontools.org.uk/research/, which concludes that no formal
ethical approval is required). Written consent was obtained from each HCW described in the anony-
mised case vignettes.
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Gräf, Christopher Huang, Josh Hodgson, Kelvin Hunter, Jennifer Martin, Federica Mescia, Ciara
O’Donnell, Linda Pointon, Joy Shih, Rachel Sutcliffe, Tobias Tilly, Zhen Tong, Carmen Treacy, Jenni-
fer Wood
Department of Medicine Sample Processing and Acquisition: Laura Bergamaschi, Ariana Betan-
court, Georgie Bowyer, Aloka De Sa, Maddie Epping, Andrew Hinch, Oisin Huhn, Isobel Jarvis, Dan-
iel Lewis, Joe Marsden, Simon McCallum, Francescsa Nice, Ommar Omarjee, Marianne Perera, Nika
Romashova, Mateusz Strezlecki, Natalia Savoinykh Yarkoni, Lori Turner
Epic team/other computing support: Barrie Bailey, Afzal Chaudhry, Rachel Doughton, Chris
Workman
Statistics/modelling: Richard J Samworth, Caroline Trotter
Rivett et al. eLife 2020;9:e58728. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.58728 16 of 20
Research article Epidemiology and Global Health Human Biology and Medicine
Additional information
Group author details
The CITIID-NIHR COVID-19 BioResource Collaboration
Ravi Gupta; Paul A Lyons; Mark Toshner; Ben Warne; Josefin Bartholdson Scott; Claire Cormie;
Harmeet Gill; Iain Kean; Mailis Maes; Nicola Reynolds; Michelle Wantoch; Sarah Caddy; Laura
Caller; Theresa Feltwell; Grant Hall; Myra Hosmillo; Charlotte Houldcroft; Aminu Jahun; Fahad
Khokhar; Anna Yakovleva; Helen Butcher; Daniela Caputo; Debra Clapham-Riley; Helen Dolling;
Anita Furlong; Barbara Graves; Emma Le Gresley; Nathalie Kingston; Sofia Papadia; Hannah
Stark; Kathleen E Stirrups; Jennifer Webster; Joanna Calder ; Julie Harris; Sarah Hewitt; Jane
Kennet ; Anne Meadows; Rebecca Rastall; Criona O Brien; Jo Price; Cherry Publico; Jane
Rowlands; Valentina Ruffolo; Hugo Tordesillas; Karen Brookes; Laura Canna; Isabel Cruz; Katie
Dempsey; Anne Elmer; Naidine Escoffery; Heather Jones; Carla Ribeiro; Caroline Saunders;
Angela Wright; Rutendo Nyagumbo; Anne Roberts; Ashlea Bucke; Simone Hargreaves; Danielle
Johnson; Aileen Narcorda; Debbie Read; Christian Sparke; Lucy Warboys; Kirsty Lagadu;
Lenette Mactavous; Tim Gould; Tim Raine; Claire Mather; Nicola Ramenatte; Anne-Laure Vallier;
Mary Kasanicki; Penelope-Jane Eames; Chris McNicholas; Lisa Thake; Neil Bartholomew; Nick
Brown; Surendra Parmar ; Hongyi Zhang; Ailsa Bowring; Geraldine Martell; Natalie Quinnell; Jo
Wright; Helen Murphy; Benjamin J Dunmore; Ekaterina Legchenko; Stefan Gräf; Christopher
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